Friday, December 12, 2008

Union-Busting As Stated Policy of the American Government

I just concluded a paper on labor law, especially focused on the agenda-setting and policy-making processes of labor law reform, keying in on legislative and administrative changes to its application in terms of majority sign-up and the makeup of the NLRB. One thing I kept coming across was the nature and degree of change in applied policy from the federal government toward workers, unions, and collective bargaining. In short, we now have a labor law regime that is tilted against these concepts and toward their diametric opposites, management, business, and union-busting; the original intent as per the 1935 Wagner Act and for a while after its codification (even after Taft-Hartley in many respects, although that is subject to interpretation) was to prioritize and favor unionization of workers and collective bargaining as matters of good economic policy and justice for workers.

Now, we have the Bob Corkers (R-Foreign Autos, Jackson Hewitt) and Richard Shelby (R-Union Busting) talking about "getting unions off the backs" of business. There you have it, explicit confirmation that the objective of American economic and labor law policy, at least for one part and one slice of the political pie, is union-busting and anti-worker notions.

This auto industry debate has laid bare the contours, as if 50 years of politics did not do so, of how Republicans and conservatives approach workers, worker rights, and economic prosperity. Bear in mind that the favorability rating of unions stands at 68% favorable to 28% unfavorable. Find me a politician with those numbers and I'll show you a sure re-elect. Further, 53% of the American public as workers would choose unionization today. And the number keep on coming like that, if you look at opinion research from the likes of Pew, Gallup, ANES, and the like.

These folks are just wrong, and they're proving yet again how out-of-touch they are with the American people.

But don't get me started on the false equivalencies of the media, arguably worse, given their supposed role in a democracy, than the Republicans whose frames of approach they adopt. Disgusting. Just not as disgusting as the intent to codify into law and policy the union-busting and anti-worker approach of Republicans.

Are liberals the new moderates? Is the left the new center?

Please bear in mind, as party is not equal to Party, the "left" is not the "Left." If the former describes a relative position on a bi-directional, uni-dimensional spectrum of ideology, the latter describes a political movement with certain core ideological principles of political economy. They are not the same. What I am talking about below is the former, the "left."

And further, I'm not going to spend time here addressing ideological labels like "liberal" and "progressive" (as well as "moderate" and "conservative") and what they mean. As such, labels are proper nouns and things like "left" and "right" and "center" are terms of relative position on the aforementioned spectrum. And even further, I am not going to address the multi-axial, perhaps multi-directional nature of ideology in terms of both mass versions in the electorate and on an individual level. Too much for a quick exposition of ideas that seem more operative in a sense of timeliness. And I suppose, these relative and proper labels are certainly not integrative of the discontinuity of self-identification and policy preference.

I've been reading and hearing a lot that the difference between Larry Summers and say, a David Sirota, in terms of ideological approach, is much less than say between Larry Summers and a Henry Paulson. I think that this is probably true, regardless of the timing. In terms of real ideological character, I'm not so sure. But that's not my point here.

The somewhat radicalizing terms in which we live, both by virtue of the tail end of the Bush years, and the consolidation of the effects of a 30 year-plus dominance of conservatism and market fetishism, has perhaps altered the relativity of the ideological spectrum. Liberal is now the new moderate. See: regulation and government intervention into the economy for the purposes of public good. And left seems to be the new center. More on this later, but it's an idea of weight, I think.

What this means in terms of consequent action by virtue of the national mood and public acceptance of different policies and political approaches...wow. It could be drastic.

(Note: I think I spent more time explaining what I was and wasn't going to say versus saying something. That's OK. The idea itself is merely being tossed out - understanding what that idea is can be very important.)

Shape of Parties To Come

Today, the two parties in the electorate and in government represent distinct coalitions of voters largely mirroring something of a split with an ostensibly more liberal party (Democrats) and a conservative party (Republicans). But they are not uniformly aligned along an axis of ideology (I don't believe that the parties ever have been). There is not a progressive or liberal party quite like there is a conservative party. And ideological differentiations in the electorate and in those who make up government are shifting, as per demographics, geography, and socio-economic characteristics. Running through this really takes a lot more analysis and writing to cover thoroughly.

But consider this proposition in thinking about the developing contours of American politics over the next 25 years, especially in the context of the coming civil war of sorts in the GOP (whether or not they get what the civil war should be fought over - hint to the GOP: it's not tactics, it's strategy; and no one is - and god willing, will be - buying your current strategic political program):

(Note: I use ideological labels as in popular usage - this is to say that "true conservative" has little meaning outside of the contemporary definitions of conservatism...balanced budgets are not inherently an ideological proposition, they take on ideological character only the context of current economic situations and choices of priorities. Same deal with foreign affairs activity.)

The GOP will become a party marked by socio-cultural conservatism and foreign affairs militarism (as if they aren't already). Some older guard business and wealth elites will cling to the party and eventually fade away. The uniform coalition of economic royalist conservatives, socio-cultural conservatives, and foreign affairs conservatives is and has been breaking up and it will cleave in the near future.

The Democratic party (note: lower-case "p," please people!) will become a party of socio-cultural liberals, foreign affairs liberals, and business elites. The working class and unionists, holding other characteristics constant, will lean towards the Democrats.

None of this seems revelatory - but my point is that this will become the dominant narrative as these contours become written very large. There will be a disconnect between ideology and party in that the former has multiple axes (and perhaps two dimensions) while the latter is only bi-directional on one axis. What remains to be seen is if this trending continues. What will predict it is the performance of the Democratic party in government. Will they govern as progressives or liberals, or will they govern as center-right-ish "moderates," making false choices and neglecting the political economy of politics and economics both.

As always, remember that parties and ideology are not one and the same (as noted above, both in terms of axes and dimensions) and that party is not Party.

My project: build a stronger Party while at the same time working to create a more progressive party. I believe that both must include integration of consideration of political economy of class, universalist policy, and economic justice. If this is successful, the party contours as noted above, to say nothing of the ideological contours un-discussed, will be totally wrong in appraising reality.

Tuesday, November 25, 2008

More On Pragmatism

If pragmatism is walking the straightest line to achieve an end or being focused above all else on ends rather than means (without introducing ethical conundrums, at least for the purpose of this thought experiment), doesn't the notion of "pragmatic progressive" seem a bit outlandish?

Consider:

"Pragmatic" is used to modify "progressive," meaning that progressive is inherently non-pragmatic, a label to indicate pie-in-the-sky dreaming and the like.

But also consider:

The scope our nation's problems during the current crisis require a) an unprecedented (at least since the 20th Century's Great Depression) scope and b) real solutions, would it not be pragmatic to put together the most progressive policy solutions? Methinks yes (or else I wouldn't write this).

"Pragmatic" is being used as a code-word for "compromise on first principles to the corporatocracy and have an excuse for selling out the left-of-center, not to mention the best interests."

I sure as shit hope that Bob Rubin's apologies (of sorts) of late and the newfound progressivism of many of the financial/fiscal/economic-policy elite of the Democratic party is genuine. Or else we will not end up with the solutions needed to cross the threshold of saving our economy and restructuring it for longer-term success - we need progressive action to right this ship, that is, we need to be pragmatic, which means to choose progressive solutions here.

"Pragmatic" can only modify "progressive" in the sense of the former yielding the latter. All else is simply window-dressing on an ideological and political shell game.

Monday, November 24, 2008

Ideology As Important In Government

The right has beaten us for years in making ideology a part of all things political. I don't begrudge them that - I think it's a really important part of democratic politics. I begrudge them being wrong and having an ideology that is just faulty and immoral.

That said, the nascent Obama administration has been a veritable case study in how ideology seems to be totally missing from the alleged savior of the nation and of progressive politics (I think he's neither, even while I'm glad he's in the White House in less than 60 days). Not totally. Bust mostly. As noted in quite a good front-page diary on OpenLeft today, the "pragmatism" of Obama seems to be more important than having a coherent approach to solving social problems through the democratic political process.

Let me just say that this is such an intellectually dishonest proposition, probably stronger language than that of the piece at OpenLeft - but something that I think is warranted. I definitely recommend reading the piece. It has some very good points on ideology as natural in politics and certainly about the honesty of having and articulating an ideology instead of masking some non-ideological (cousin to non-, trans-, or post-partisan in many senses, especially with Obama and friends) statement or public argument about "pragmatism."

Some choice passages and quotations:

Introducing it all...

There has been here, and elsewhere, a low-level (ahem) ideological debate about the relative importance of ideology versus pragmatism. To some, the election of Obama is seen as a victory for getting things done as opposed to what I suppose in this formulation is the old Washington game of tilting at ideological windmills.


Being all reflexive (and spot-on)...

There is another fundamental problem with the ideology of pragmatism (yes, "I hate ideology" is an ideology too!) - that can be expressed as a question: What goals do these pragmatic policies advance?



At a conceptual level, ideology is a simply a heuristic for selecting the best path in problems without an obvious or easily discerned solution. So you "guess." You pick a method that, though not guaranteed to solve every problem, hopefully makes them no worse, and maybe leads to other desirable side-effects even if the core problem remains.


Actually, I do not agree completely with the above. Ideology is not a heuristic. Heuristics are conceptual shortcuts. Ideology is an overarching framework for understanding the world - which yields structure and salience of heuristics. Ideology does not lead to hazarding of guesses - it leads to some degree of certainty. That results match up with this is the test of an ideology that is more than decent theory on paper and instead good in practice. Some might even say pragmatic...

Actually, as I say it, the statement is made differently...

Ideology entails both a specific solution to a specific problem, but also a general approach to larger challenges.


Closing things out with a statement that rings far truer than most in traditional media, and with much conceptual baggage and inherent consequence than perhaps intended to be ascribed to a concluding sentence...

Ideology is not a dirty word. "Ideologue" may be, but they're not the same thing. Without it, we are adrift in a sea of problems, without a compass or a destination in mind.



"Getting things done" is lauded in public discourse - like "bi-partisanship" and "compromise". Well what about getting the right things done the right way? The wrong things getting done the wrong way have led us to this situation of economic crises. - including some of the 'leaders' being those who mouthed a sort of "serious" technocratic "pragmatism" as a guise, dishonest or mistaken, for neoliberalism and its cousin conservatism (Bob Rubin, I'm looking at you - and I'm not sorry that you're getting something of a media comeuppance these days, if for the wrong reasons i.e. Citigroup failures instead of that of his "public service" in the Clinton administration).

Again, let me ask you to identify which is more important:

1. Getting things done.
2. Getting the right things done the right way.

As importantly, ideology is vital in our politics. I'll look to explore this more in full in the future. We are living through a case-study in repeating similar failures because of failing to truly understand prior history of politics and government.

Sunday, November 23, 2008

Partisanship, Ideology, And Politics

An area of keen interest to me has been and will continue to be that of the intersections of partisanship and ideology in the electorate. I've even done some quantitative research on the topic(s) and I'll lean on that - as well as other ideas - in discussing a few related subjects that I think are vital to understand and interpret American politics and our political system. Over the course of the next few weeks, I'll try to cover some of my thoughts on this in the way I organize them conceptually. They are:

1. Ideology As A Continuum
2. Partisanship Is Not Ideology And Vice Versa
3. Ideology As Multi-dimensional
4. Partisanship As Identification

I might add more, but these are some of the major topical areas in the realm of partisanship and ideology, at least as I see them.

No time like the present, so I'll dig right in, motivated by some of the discussion in popular/traditional (my "popular," I don't necessary mean the form that is necessarily "popular," but instead in the scholarly convention of that which is created for consumption by the vast majority of the populace) media of the nature of this country's ideology makeup. I won't pretend to be willing and able to exhaustively cover the topic - that's a matter for PhD-level dissertations and essays. But I will offer up some thoughts that I think are instructive to considerations and discussions of ideology and partisanship.

Specifically, tonight, I'd like to address the conceptual underpinnings of the consideration of ideology. I do so without necessarily defining narrowly my notions of ideology. I'll try to do that in future diaries, especially that of ideology as a multi-dimensional concept.

My focus here is on the alleged continuum of ideology - as in having a center interposed between a left and a right.

First, let's be clear on a few things. One is that when we speak of ideology, we inherently must consider ideological movements. In America, where there is a noted exceptionalism in matters of ideology, we have never had a real capital "l" Left. No matter what Bill O'Reilly or Rush Limbaugh screech, there has never really been a real and organized Left. There have been flickers in the 1920 and 1930s as well as separately in the 1960s, but there has never really been a strong socialist or even social democratic movement in this nation. There has, however, been and continues to be a real concerted and coherent Right. In fact, there has been since the 1910s or 1920s, from the proto-fascist right of Lindbergh and Coughlin to the re-birth of a conservative, rightist movement that became the modern conservative movement in the 1950s. They are explicitly rightist, though exhibiting various tendencies of rightist conservatism, and while perhaps not reaching an apex of a fully-fledged "Right," they have existed as a strong ideological movement and one of popular import in American politics.

Another consideration is that, as I will address more in full at a later time, ideology is a multi-axial conception of the relationship of government, society, economics, and culture.

Another consideration is that mass ideology is different from individual ideology. For example, there might 100 people that exhibit come consensus vision for society based upon a broadly-conceived ideology, but those 100 could exhibit great diversity in their individual views according to that general ideological disposition. That is a strong factor in our politics. And combined with the previous notion of ideology as multi-axial, this is perhaps one of the driving factors in coming up with a mass ideology of which to speak in general, though hardly definitive terms with respect to our political system.

Yet another consideration, as many have probably noted, there is a real difference of opinion left-of-center (and I'll address this notion of relative positioning in the real substance of this diary; just go with the term for now) on what is the left-of-center ideological mainstream (within that grouping). It is a matter of language and inhering ideas. Simply put, there are liberals and there are progressives, both exhibiting differing notions of left-of-center ideology, though they are generally grouped together as a monolithic left-of-center center of gravity. This is different from having a multi-axial ideology; progressivism and liberalism are distinct visions though similar in their underlying ideological framework. There is not, as far as I know, an analogue on the right. Both left-of-center and right-of-center exhibit the multi-axial 'problems,' but only left-of-center exhibits this sort of ideological schizophrenia on the mass level.

Finally, without fully delving into definitional discussions of ideology, it should be noted that ideology can come in three flavors in the electorate and in individuals.

First is that of self-identification. Roughly 20-25% of the electorate identifies as liberal. Roughly 30% identify as conservative. The remainder identify as moderate. This set of figures goes back at least a few decades now (as an aside, it is interesting to compare this to elite opinion of the 1950s and early 1960s, where conservatism was largely dead in the public eye on the mass level; liberalism reigned supreme). However, this set of figures does not account for "progressive" as a potential category.

As noted above, there is considerable debate over labels in the left-of-center. I tend to believe that liberalism and progressivism are distinct and different for the most part. Other believe that they are veritably interchangeable and that "liberal" as a word has been so thoroughly tarnished by a popular and mass campaign by the right that "progressive" must now be it's stand-in (and there is a subset that believes that "liberal" must be rehabilitated as such). But early research has shown that with four ideological labels, "progressive" becomes a plurality, sucking up much of "liberal" and a good chunk of "moderate." So self-identification is a matter of study in ideology.

Second, ideology as a matter of self-identification has proven problematic. One issue is that the electorate, simply put, is not particularly sophisticated in applying such labels and they will tend towards popular "approved" terms. As noted, "liberal" has been tarnished and "conservative" vaunted. "Moderate" behaves more like the latter, elevated in stature by the likes of an elite cadre of believers and creators of conventional wisdom.

So, ideology cannot strictly be determined by self-identification in a real analysis of the electorate. I should note that my research on this topic, formally, focused most directly on self-identification on not on what follows here.

Ideology can be summarized by an aggregation of issue positions and an accompanying definition of what constitutes a tendency towards an ideology. Again, ideology is multi-axial, so this can prove problematic. For example, if someone responds affirmatively that healthcare should be a universal right and that the government has a role in guaranteeing it through affirmative program and action, that can be 'coded' as "liberal." If someone responds affirmatively that healthcare is a matter for markets to decide and that government should have no role in the matter, that can be 'coded' as "conservative." Obviously, this is problematic because a) definitions of ideology are then subject to the whims of the researcher b) ideology's multiple axes must be compressed into one single continuum (to be addressed here later). But one can credibly create an individual's - and an electorate's mass - ideological disposition based upon an aggregation of issue positions outside of a self-identification on a question asking one's ideology.

Third, ideology can be considered as a hybrid combination of issue positions and self-identification. This is probably the most robust notion conceptually, but statistically breaks down because of the non-sophistication of the electorate and the confusing of terms by decades of a concerted effort by the right to create a thought regime of asymmetry in ideology. There are scores of individual respondents in public opinion research that identify issue positions that we could reach consensus as being "liberal" but who self-identify, even strongly, as conservative.

So all three conceptions of ideology are important, but none of perfect. And none are inherently better statistically for analysis. My previous research focused on the first, because as a matter of research interest, I think that it is vital - especially in the context of an activist academic thinker and doer - that we understand ideology and its underlying factors in the polity in terms of one thing that really heavily influences political behavior on the long-term.

Now, all that said, let me address notions of relative ideological positions in the context of a pure-and-simple notion of ideology, without the baggage of research questions and problems as noted above.

We as a public are regularly subjected to talk of the nature of this nation's fundamental ideological disposition. Quite often, we are "treated" to two pathologies of a distaste for progressive/liberal/left-of-center/left in that discussion. One is that the conventional wisdom that there are equal components of extremists on two ends of an ideological spectrum. There is, according to this view, an extreme left and (maybe) an extreme right. Were one to achieve a consensus view of 'extreme' versions of left and right thought, I do not believe that one could find a preponderance of an extreme left in this country while one can easily find an extreme right. Further, there are virtually no voices of an extreme left in popular consciousness (e.g. politics, media) while there are certainly voices of the extreme right. But we are subject to a false equivalency of their presence and potency.

This is really a product, in my mind, of what I will discuss further on, but certainly related to the second pathology, itself a product of the real topic at hand in this diary. This second concept is that of a moderate center of public and political opinion. This is the conventional wisdom holding that the American people as an electorate are situated in between two ends of a continuum of ideology. It is the same notion that holds the keys to other items of conventional wisdom (e.g. the vitality of bi-partisanship as a virtue itself, "compromise" as virtuous action with regard to ideology or partisanship). I believe that this false "center-ism" (as I apply a term) or 'centrism' (as popularly conceived, and with which I disagree as an intellectual dishonesty or falsehood) is both toxic and demonstrably wrong. That is a matter for the future though I believe as it should probably follow from a more thorough grounding in the nature of partisanship and ideology and their interactions and underpinnings.

But to the point, mass ideology is generally thought of in conventional wisdom as a continuum or spectrum that runs left to right with a center. Further, this conventional wisdom seems predisposed to believe that this spectrum is anchored and absolute. As someone who wrote his senior thesis in philosophy on epistemology and in particular on absolute and relative truth, I take great issue with this.

First, the spectrum. Again, noting the dearth of real 'left' and "extreme left" thought and the wealth of that of the right and its extremes, this line of the ideological spectrum does not run fully to the left as it does to the right - at least in the minds and popular presence of ideological elites in public affairs. This says nothing of the electorate as such. And the electorate, in a democracy, should be of some importance. There is strong evidence that on particular issues, the American electorate itself is of more a 'left' predisposition on first principles if not values and policy prescriptions (although it tends to be on those too). But elites and the conventional wisdom hold a different set of assumptions and beliefs, and they are direct inputs in the actions of policy-makers and elected officials as proverbial "thought-" and "opinion-leaders."

This is a difficult proposition of the 'ideological process,' as I'll call it, because there is a reinforcing loop between popular and mass opinion and that of its elite leaders. But we try to interpret in mid-stream of the loop, frozen in conceptual time.

There is probably more that I could say about the spectrum, or alleged spectrum. But this is a blog, not a scholarly paper for singular publication at a moment in time - this is an evolving discussion that captures this point in conceptual time and is not necessarily meant to be definitive in the sense of being timeless and adding to a body of research. And certainly, I do not cover all the intellectual bases needed here to reach that level of discourse and vitality. I think I'll probably return to this, especially in the context of ideological opinion, later in this 'series' and at other times.

But what originally motivated me to write something on this topic and to endeavor to a 'series' of discussions of ideology and partisanship is the nature of relativism on the alleged ideological spectrum. Simply put, elite opinion vis a vis conventional wisdom is that there is a relative center between a left and a right, and one that encompasses the broad mass thought of the American electorate. This, I do not believe, is true.

Ideology is individual and mass both. Individuals hold individual opinions and aggregate into a mass. But on the mass scale, there is not inherently an aggregation proper of all opinion in some sort of grand equilibrium or average or median. Even thinking about it as such leaves one wanting for an explanation for the preponderance of center-ism.

Say for example that there is an electorate of 1000 people. Two hundred and fifty are generally liberal and conservative each, there are 100 each that are strongly conservative and liberal. Three hundred are moderate. But where does that leave the center, mathematically? It is hard to say and subject to interpretation. 350 each are essentially liberal or conservative while only 300 are moderate. Or, there are 00 that are in a general middle and 200 strongly ideological. But what are the degrees of the 250 on each end that are generally of one ideological disposition? What about the degrees of the strongly ideological? There are certainly other questions that could be asked about the nature of mass ideology. But we are regularly treated to discussion of ideology as inherently moderate or in the center.

Which brings me to the next point, is moderate in the center? What is moderate anyway? Is it a matter of degrees or a distinct ideological flavoring? Again, many questions can follow on this. Just like many questions can follow from a simplistic treatment of mass ideology.

Now, we must also address the axes of ideology as a matter of relativism. Conceptually, if the center is between two points, are we triangulating geometric points to find a center between all or of a general take on ideology (which I noted is anti-left in elite, conventional wisdom circles)? How are we defining this geometry? What if the spectrum is not linear (as I will address in the future)? How do we handle degrees? How do we handle absolute positions and then posit a relative position? These are the conceptual questions that are not only poorly-addressed, but they are rarely raised up in popular discourse on mass and individual ideology in the electorate. And for that, we have a poverty of political discussion, regardless of the real dynamics of political opinion as per identification and issue positions. Then again, what is the center between two issue positions?

I think that a good voice on public affairs can and should at times ask more questions than he or she answers. And while I certainly have my own opinions on some of these questions and a definitive framework to address them (which is constantly in search of a better articulation, a struggle itself), I think that simply raising up these questions is important as we work toward a political system that best addresses the common good and public interest as well as the democratic notions, in truth, of the electorate (which may not always align with the common good/public interest).

Suffice it to say that conventional wisdom on ideology is certainly impoverished by a lack of rigor in thought and analysis on the conceptual-theoretical level and the empirical level both. Center-ism is just a manifestation of this, and it is not one that holds of to critical thought and research particularly well. But for the time being, until it is thoroughly debunked, we will continue to live with it.

Friday, November 21, 2008

Why the "P" (or "p") In Democratic _arty Matters

The combination of the words "democratic" and "party" gets tossed around a lot as an essentially interchangeable concept, no matter how one treats the "p" in "party" as modifying "Democratic." But that's incorrect, and worse, it does a disservice to our discussion of progressive politics and American politics in general.

Political scientists who study parties and American politics in general usually look at 'parties' per se as three entities (and I'll just refer to the Democratic (P/p)arty here, not any others really). One is the Democratic Party proper, the party organization itself. For example, I am involved in my local and state Democratic Party organizations as an activist and as an officer. I pay my dues, I raise money, I volunteer for Democratic candidates and the party itself, I attend meeting...etc. The second version of parties is "party in government," as in the elected and appointed leaders in government (legislative and executive branches) who identify as and are elected as "Democratic" candidates. For example, my Congresswoman, the fabulous Tammy Baldwin, is a Democratic member of the U.S. House and caucuses with the other Democrats there. Finally, there is the "party in the electorate," which is a much more complex concept.

The Democratic party - and here, one does not capitalize the "p," as is usually the case with party-in-government too - is, like all parties-in-the-electorate, a combination of Democratic-identifying voters (including those who register as such, and in some cases these folks are part of the Democratic Party), Democratic-identified interest groups and organizations, and the voters that support a Democratic candidate in a given election. The Democratic party as a party-in-the-electorate is an aggregation and generally a coalition of individuals and organizations that is without a concerted program or teleology - it just is as a grouping.

So when people make reference to the "Democratic party," the intent of their words really matters, especially when we consider criticisms, normative statements, and the like. My general frame of reference, as a party leader in terms of the party-as-organization, is that folks are referring to the party organization. I subconsciously move directly to that when people say "Democratic party," and I have to check myself if that's not what they mean.

I'll speak to this more in the future, but I just want to lay out that the Democratic Party and the Democratic party are distinct conceptual constructs. One is very firm - you can go visit the office of your local party organization, you can give money to the party (and you should!), you can receive mail from the party organization, you can...well, you get the picture. But one cannot say with intellectual coherence, "The Democrats should ______" because unless you're speaking about the party organization (and I believe that one can do so in this kind of statement, as in "The Democrats should put together a concerted, strategic campaign to build membership."), you are not referring to a particular decision-maker or set of decision-makers who have the ability to implement what one is suggesting.

Democratic Party does not equal Democratic party, and that distinction is critical.