If pragmatism is walking the straightest line to achieve an end or being focused above all else on ends rather than means (without introducing ethical conundrums, at least for the purpose of this thought experiment), doesn't the notion of "pragmatic progressive" seem a bit outlandish?
Consider:
"Pragmatic" is used to modify "progressive," meaning that progressive is inherently non-pragmatic, a label to indicate pie-in-the-sky dreaming and the like.
But also consider:
The scope our nation's problems during the current crisis require a) an unprecedented (at least since the 20th Century's Great Depression) scope and b) real solutions, would it not be pragmatic to put together the most progressive policy solutions? Methinks yes (or else I wouldn't write this).
"Pragmatic" is being used as a code-word for "compromise on first principles to the corporatocracy and have an excuse for selling out the left-of-center, not to mention the best interests."
I sure as shit hope that Bob Rubin's apologies (of sorts) of late and the newfound progressivism of many of the financial/fiscal/economic-policy elite of the Democratic party is genuine. Or else we will not end up with the solutions needed to cross the threshold of saving our economy and restructuring it for longer-term success - we need progressive action to right this ship, that is, we need to be pragmatic, which means to choose progressive solutions here.
"Pragmatic" can only modify "progressive" in the sense of the former yielding the latter. All else is simply window-dressing on an ideological and political shell game.
Tuesday, November 25, 2008
Monday, November 24, 2008
Ideology As Important In Government
The right has beaten us for years in making ideology a part of all things political. I don't begrudge them that - I think it's a really important part of democratic politics. I begrudge them being wrong and having an ideology that is just faulty and immoral.
That said, the nascent Obama administration has been a veritable case study in how ideology seems to be totally missing from the alleged savior of the nation and of progressive politics (I think he's neither, even while I'm glad he's in the White House in less than 60 days). Not totally. Bust mostly. As noted in quite a good front-page diary on OpenLeft today, the "pragmatism" of Obama seems to be more important than having a coherent approach to solving social problems through the democratic political process.
Let me just say that this is such an intellectually dishonest proposition, probably stronger language than that of the piece at OpenLeft - but something that I think is warranted. I definitely recommend reading the piece. It has some very good points on ideology as natural in politics and certainly about the honesty of having and articulating an ideology instead of masking some non-ideological (cousin to non-, trans-, or post-partisan in many senses, especially with Obama and friends) statement or public argument about "pragmatism."
Some choice passages and quotations:
Introducing it all...
Being all reflexive (and spot-on)...
Actually, I do not agree completely with the above. Ideology is not a heuristic. Heuristics are conceptual shortcuts. Ideology is an overarching framework for understanding the world - which yields structure and salience of heuristics. Ideology does not lead to hazarding of guesses - it leads to some degree of certainty. That results match up with this is the test of an ideology that is more than decent theory on paper and instead good in practice. Some might even say pragmatic...
Actually, as I say it, the statement is made differently...
Closing things out with a statement that rings far truer than most in traditional media, and with much conceptual baggage and inherent consequence than perhaps intended to be ascribed to a concluding sentence...
"Getting things done" is lauded in public discourse - like "bi-partisanship" and "compromise". Well what about getting the right things done the right way? The wrong things getting done the wrong way have led us to this situation of economic crises. - including some of the 'leaders' being those who mouthed a sort of "serious" technocratic "pragmatism" as a guise, dishonest or mistaken, for neoliberalism and its cousin conservatism (Bob Rubin, I'm looking at you - and I'm not sorry that you're getting something of a media comeuppance these days, if for the wrong reasons i.e. Citigroup failures instead of that of his "public service" in the Clinton administration).
Again, let me ask you to identify which is more important:
1. Getting things done.
2. Getting the right things done the right way.
As importantly, ideology is vital in our politics. I'll look to explore this more in full in the future. We are living through a case-study in repeating similar failures because of failing to truly understand prior history of politics and government.
That said, the nascent Obama administration has been a veritable case study in how ideology seems to be totally missing from the alleged savior of the nation and of progressive politics (I think he's neither, even while I'm glad he's in the White House in less than 60 days). Not totally. Bust mostly. As noted in quite a good front-page diary on OpenLeft today, the "pragmatism" of Obama seems to be more important than having a coherent approach to solving social problems through the democratic political process.
Let me just say that this is such an intellectually dishonest proposition, probably stronger language than that of the piece at OpenLeft - but something that I think is warranted. I definitely recommend reading the piece. It has some very good points on ideology as natural in politics and certainly about the honesty of having and articulating an ideology instead of masking some non-ideological (cousin to non-, trans-, or post-partisan in many senses, especially with Obama and friends) statement or public argument about "pragmatism."
Some choice passages and quotations:
Introducing it all...
There has been here, and elsewhere, a low-level (ahem) ideological debate about the relative importance of ideology versus pragmatism. To some, the election of Obama is seen as a victory for getting things done as opposed to what I suppose in this formulation is the old Washington game of tilting at ideological windmills.
Being all reflexive (and spot-on)...
There is another fundamental problem with the ideology of pragmatism (yes, "I hate ideology" is an ideology too!) - that can be expressed as a question: What goals do these pragmatic policies advance?
At a conceptual level, ideology is a simply a heuristic for selecting the best path in problems without an obvious or easily discerned solution. So you "guess." You pick a method that, though not guaranteed to solve every problem, hopefully makes them no worse, and maybe leads to other desirable side-effects even if the core problem remains.
Actually, I do not agree completely with the above. Ideology is not a heuristic. Heuristics are conceptual shortcuts. Ideology is an overarching framework for understanding the world - which yields structure and salience of heuristics. Ideology does not lead to hazarding of guesses - it leads to some degree of certainty. That results match up with this is the test of an ideology that is more than decent theory on paper and instead good in practice. Some might even say pragmatic...
Actually, as I say it, the statement is made differently...
Ideology entails both a specific solution to a specific problem, but also a general approach to larger challenges.
Closing things out with a statement that rings far truer than most in traditional media, and with much conceptual baggage and inherent consequence than perhaps intended to be ascribed to a concluding sentence...
Ideology is not a dirty word. "Ideologue" may be, but they're not the same thing. Without it, we are adrift in a sea of problems, without a compass or a destination in mind.
"Getting things done" is lauded in public discourse - like "bi-partisanship" and "compromise". Well what about getting the right things done the right way? The wrong things getting done the wrong way have led us to this situation of economic crises. - including some of the 'leaders' being those who mouthed a sort of "serious" technocratic "pragmatism" as a guise, dishonest or mistaken, for neoliberalism and its cousin conservatism (Bob Rubin, I'm looking at you - and I'm not sorry that you're getting something of a media comeuppance these days, if for the wrong reasons i.e. Citigroup failures instead of that of his "public service" in the Clinton administration).
Again, let me ask you to identify which is more important:
1. Getting things done.
2. Getting the right things done the right way.
As importantly, ideology is vital in our politics. I'll look to explore this more in full in the future. We are living through a case-study in repeating similar failures because of failing to truly understand prior history of politics and government.
Sunday, November 23, 2008
Partisanship, Ideology, And Politics
An area of keen interest to me has been and will continue to be that of the intersections of partisanship and ideology in the electorate. I've even done some quantitative research on the topic(s) and I'll lean on that - as well as other ideas - in discussing a few related subjects that I think are vital to understand and interpret American politics and our political system. Over the course of the next few weeks, I'll try to cover some of my thoughts on this in the way I organize them conceptually. They are:
1. Ideology As A Continuum
2. Partisanship Is Not Ideology And Vice Versa
3. Ideology As Multi-dimensional
4. Partisanship As Identification
I might add more, but these are some of the major topical areas in the realm of partisanship and ideology, at least as I see them.
No time like the present, so I'll dig right in, motivated by some of the discussion in popular/traditional (my "popular," I don't necessary mean the form that is necessarily "popular," but instead in the scholarly convention of that which is created for consumption by the vast majority of the populace) media of the nature of this country's ideology makeup. I won't pretend to be willing and able to exhaustively cover the topic - that's a matter for PhD-level dissertations and essays. But I will offer up some thoughts that I think are instructive to considerations and discussions of ideology and partisanship.
Specifically, tonight, I'd like to address the conceptual underpinnings of the consideration of ideology. I do so without necessarily defining narrowly my notions of ideology. I'll try to do that in future diaries, especially that of ideology as a multi-dimensional concept.
My focus here is on the alleged continuum of ideology - as in having a center interposed between a left and a right.
First, let's be clear on a few things. One is that when we speak of ideology, we inherently must consider ideological movements. In America, where there is a noted exceptionalism in matters of ideology, we have never had a real capital "l" Left. No matter what Bill O'Reilly or Rush Limbaugh screech, there has never really been a real and organized Left. There have been flickers in the 1920 and 1930s as well as separately in the 1960s, but there has never really been a strong socialist or even social democratic movement in this nation. There has, however, been and continues to be a real concerted and coherent Right. In fact, there has been since the 1910s or 1920s, from the proto-fascist right of Lindbergh and Coughlin to the re-birth of a conservative, rightist movement that became the modern conservative movement in the 1950s. They are explicitly rightist, though exhibiting various tendencies of rightist conservatism, and while perhaps not reaching an apex of a fully-fledged "Right," they have existed as a strong ideological movement and one of popular import in American politics.
Another consideration is that, as I will address more in full at a later time, ideology is a multi-axial conception of the relationship of government, society, economics, and culture.
Another consideration is that mass ideology is different from individual ideology. For example, there might 100 people that exhibit come consensus vision for society based upon a broadly-conceived ideology, but those 100 could exhibit great diversity in their individual views according to that general ideological disposition. That is a strong factor in our politics. And combined with the previous notion of ideology as multi-axial, this is perhaps one of the driving factors in coming up with a mass ideology of which to speak in general, though hardly definitive terms with respect to our political system.
Yet another consideration, as many have probably noted, there is a real difference of opinion left-of-center (and I'll address this notion of relative positioning in the real substance of this diary; just go with the term for now) on what is the left-of-center ideological mainstream (within that grouping). It is a matter of language and inhering ideas. Simply put, there are liberals and there are progressives, both exhibiting differing notions of left-of-center ideology, though they are generally grouped together as a monolithic left-of-center center of gravity. This is different from having a multi-axial ideology; progressivism and liberalism are distinct visions though similar in their underlying ideological framework. There is not, as far as I know, an analogue on the right. Both left-of-center and right-of-center exhibit the multi-axial 'problems,' but only left-of-center exhibits this sort of ideological schizophrenia on the mass level.
Finally, without fully delving into definitional discussions of ideology, it should be noted that ideology can come in three flavors in the electorate and in individuals.
First is that of self-identification. Roughly 20-25% of the electorate identifies as liberal. Roughly 30% identify as conservative. The remainder identify as moderate. This set of figures goes back at least a few decades now (as an aside, it is interesting to compare this to elite opinion of the 1950s and early 1960s, where conservatism was largely dead in the public eye on the mass level; liberalism reigned supreme). However, this set of figures does not account for "progressive" as a potential category.
As noted above, there is considerable debate over labels in the left-of-center. I tend to believe that liberalism and progressivism are distinct and different for the most part. Other believe that they are veritably interchangeable and that "liberal" as a word has been so thoroughly tarnished by a popular and mass campaign by the right that "progressive" must now be it's stand-in (and there is a subset that believes that "liberal" must be rehabilitated as such). But early research has shown that with four ideological labels, "progressive" becomes a plurality, sucking up much of "liberal" and a good chunk of "moderate." So self-identification is a matter of study in ideology.
Second, ideology as a matter of self-identification has proven problematic. One issue is that the electorate, simply put, is not particularly sophisticated in applying such labels and they will tend towards popular "approved" terms. As noted, "liberal" has been tarnished and "conservative" vaunted. "Moderate" behaves more like the latter, elevated in stature by the likes of an elite cadre of believers and creators of conventional wisdom.
So, ideology cannot strictly be determined by self-identification in a real analysis of the electorate. I should note that my research on this topic, formally, focused most directly on self-identification on not on what follows here.
Ideology can be summarized by an aggregation of issue positions and an accompanying definition of what constitutes a tendency towards an ideology. Again, ideology is multi-axial, so this can prove problematic. For example, if someone responds affirmatively that healthcare should be a universal right and that the government has a role in guaranteeing it through affirmative program and action, that can be 'coded' as "liberal." If someone responds affirmatively that healthcare is a matter for markets to decide and that government should have no role in the matter, that can be 'coded' as "conservative." Obviously, this is problematic because a) definitions of ideology are then subject to the whims of the researcher b) ideology's multiple axes must be compressed into one single continuum (to be addressed here later). But one can credibly create an individual's - and an electorate's mass - ideological disposition based upon an aggregation of issue positions outside of a self-identification on a question asking one's ideology.
Third, ideology can be considered as a hybrid combination of issue positions and self-identification. This is probably the most robust notion conceptually, but statistically breaks down because of the non-sophistication of the electorate and the confusing of terms by decades of a concerted effort by the right to create a thought regime of asymmetry in ideology. There are scores of individual respondents in public opinion research that identify issue positions that we could reach consensus as being "liberal" but who self-identify, even strongly, as conservative.
So all three conceptions of ideology are important, but none of perfect. And none are inherently better statistically for analysis. My previous research focused on the first, because as a matter of research interest, I think that it is vital - especially in the context of an activist academic thinker and doer - that we understand ideology and its underlying factors in the polity in terms of one thing that really heavily influences political behavior on the long-term.
Now, all that said, let me address notions of relative ideological positions in the context of a pure-and-simple notion of ideology, without the baggage of research questions and problems as noted above.
We as a public are regularly subjected to talk of the nature of this nation's fundamental ideological disposition. Quite often, we are "treated" to two pathologies of a distaste for progressive/liberal/left-of-center/left in that discussion. One is that the conventional wisdom that there are equal components of extremists on two ends of an ideological spectrum. There is, according to this view, an extreme left and (maybe) an extreme right. Were one to achieve a consensus view of 'extreme' versions of left and right thought, I do not believe that one could find a preponderance of an extreme left in this country while one can easily find an extreme right. Further, there are virtually no voices of an extreme left in popular consciousness (e.g. politics, media) while there are certainly voices of the extreme right. But we are subject to a false equivalency of their presence and potency.
This is really a product, in my mind, of what I will discuss further on, but certainly related to the second pathology, itself a product of the real topic at hand in this diary. This second concept is that of a moderate center of public and political opinion. This is the conventional wisdom holding that the American people as an electorate are situated in between two ends of a continuum of ideology. It is the same notion that holds the keys to other items of conventional wisdom (e.g. the vitality of bi-partisanship as a virtue itself, "compromise" as virtuous action with regard to ideology or partisanship). I believe that this false "center-ism" (as I apply a term) or 'centrism' (as popularly conceived, and with which I disagree as an intellectual dishonesty or falsehood) is both toxic and demonstrably wrong. That is a matter for the future though I believe as it should probably follow from a more thorough grounding in the nature of partisanship and ideology and their interactions and underpinnings.
But to the point, mass ideology is generally thought of in conventional wisdom as a continuum or spectrum that runs left to right with a center. Further, this conventional wisdom seems predisposed to believe that this spectrum is anchored and absolute. As someone who wrote his senior thesis in philosophy on epistemology and in particular on absolute and relative truth, I take great issue with this.
First, the spectrum. Again, noting the dearth of real 'left' and "extreme left" thought and the wealth of that of the right and its extremes, this line of the ideological spectrum does not run fully to the left as it does to the right - at least in the minds and popular presence of ideological elites in public affairs. This says nothing of the electorate as such. And the electorate, in a democracy, should be of some importance. There is strong evidence that on particular issues, the American electorate itself is of more a 'left' predisposition on first principles if not values and policy prescriptions (although it tends to be on those too). But elites and the conventional wisdom hold a different set of assumptions and beliefs, and they are direct inputs in the actions of policy-makers and elected officials as proverbial "thought-" and "opinion-leaders."
This is a difficult proposition of the 'ideological process,' as I'll call it, because there is a reinforcing loop between popular and mass opinion and that of its elite leaders. But we try to interpret in mid-stream of the loop, frozen in conceptual time.
There is probably more that I could say about the spectrum, or alleged spectrum. But this is a blog, not a scholarly paper for singular publication at a moment in time - this is an evolving discussion that captures this point in conceptual time and is not necessarily meant to be definitive in the sense of being timeless and adding to a body of research. And certainly, I do not cover all the intellectual bases needed here to reach that level of discourse and vitality. I think I'll probably return to this, especially in the context of ideological opinion, later in this 'series' and at other times.
But what originally motivated me to write something on this topic and to endeavor to a 'series' of discussions of ideology and partisanship is the nature of relativism on the alleged ideological spectrum. Simply put, elite opinion vis a vis conventional wisdom is that there is a relative center between a left and a right, and one that encompasses the broad mass thought of the American electorate. This, I do not believe, is true.
Ideology is individual and mass both. Individuals hold individual opinions and aggregate into a mass. But on the mass scale, there is not inherently an aggregation proper of all opinion in some sort of grand equilibrium or average or median. Even thinking about it as such leaves one wanting for an explanation for the preponderance of center-ism.
Say for example that there is an electorate of 1000 people. Two hundred and fifty are generally liberal and conservative each, there are 100 each that are strongly conservative and liberal. Three hundred are moderate. But where does that leave the center, mathematically? It is hard to say and subject to interpretation. 350 each are essentially liberal or conservative while only 300 are moderate. Or, there are 00 that are in a general middle and 200 strongly ideological. But what are the degrees of the 250 on each end that are generally of one ideological disposition? What about the degrees of the strongly ideological? There are certainly other questions that could be asked about the nature of mass ideology. But we are regularly treated to discussion of ideology as inherently moderate or in the center.
Which brings me to the next point, is moderate in the center? What is moderate anyway? Is it a matter of degrees or a distinct ideological flavoring? Again, many questions can follow on this. Just like many questions can follow from a simplistic treatment of mass ideology.
Now, we must also address the axes of ideology as a matter of relativism. Conceptually, if the center is between two points, are we triangulating geometric points to find a center between all or of a general take on ideology (which I noted is anti-left in elite, conventional wisdom circles)? How are we defining this geometry? What if the spectrum is not linear (as I will address in the future)? How do we handle degrees? How do we handle absolute positions and then posit a relative position? These are the conceptual questions that are not only poorly-addressed, but they are rarely raised up in popular discourse on mass and individual ideology in the electorate. And for that, we have a poverty of political discussion, regardless of the real dynamics of political opinion as per identification and issue positions. Then again, what is the center between two issue positions?
I think that a good voice on public affairs can and should at times ask more questions than he or she answers. And while I certainly have my own opinions on some of these questions and a definitive framework to address them (which is constantly in search of a better articulation, a struggle itself), I think that simply raising up these questions is important as we work toward a political system that best addresses the common good and public interest as well as the democratic notions, in truth, of the electorate (which may not always align with the common good/public interest).
Suffice it to say that conventional wisdom on ideology is certainly impoverished by a lack of rigor in thought and analysis on the conceptual-theoretical level and the empirical level both. Center-ism is just a manifestation of this, and it is not one that holds of to critical thought and research particularly well. But for the time being, until it is thoroughly debunked, we will continue to live with it.
1. Ideology As A Continuum
2. Partisanship Is Not Ideology And Vice Versa
3. Ideology As Multi-dimensional
4. Partisanship As Identification
I might add more, but these are some of the major topical areas in the realm of partisanship and ideology, at least as I see them.
No time like the present, so I'll dig right in, motivated by some of the discussion in popular/traditional (my "popular," I don't necessary mean the form that is necessarily "popular," but instead in the scholarly convention of that which is created for consumption by the vast majority of the populace) media of the nature of this country's ideology makeup. I won't pretend to be willing and able to exhaustively cover the topic - that's a matter for PhD-level dissertations and essays. But I will offer up some thoughts that I think are instructive to considerations and discussions of ideology and partisanship.
Specifically, tonight, I'd like to address the conceptual underpinnings of the consideration of ideology. I do so without necessarily defining narrowly my notions of ideology. I'll try to do that in future diaries, especially that of ideology as a multi-dimensional concept.
My focus here is on the alleged continuum of ideology - as in having a center interposed between a left and a right.
First, let's be clear on a few things. One is that when we speak of ideology, we inherently must consider ideological movements. In America, where there is a noted exceptionalism in matters of ideology, we have never had a real capital "l" Left. No matter what Bill O'Reilly or Rush Limbaugh screech, there has never really been a real and organized Left. There have been flickers in the 1920 and 1930s as well as separately in the 1960s, but there has never really been a strong socialist or even social democratic movement in this nation. There has, however, been and continues to be a real concerted and coherent Right. In fact, there has been since the 1910s or 1920s, from the proto-fascist right of Lindbergh and Coughlin to the re-birth of a conservative, rightist movement that became the modern conservative movement in the 1950s. They are explicitly rightist, though exhibiting various tendencies of rightist conservatism, and while perhaps not reaching an apex of a fully-fledged "Right," they have existed as a strong ideological movement and one of popular import in American politics.
Another consideration is that, as I will address more in full at a later time, ideology is a multi-axial conception of the relationship of government, society, economics, and culture.
Another consideration is that mass ideology is different from individual ideology. For example, there might 100 people that exhibit come consensus vision for society based upon a broadly-conceived ideology, but those 100 could exhibit great diversity in their individual views according to that general ideological disposition. That is a strong factor in our politics. And combined with the previous notion of ideology as multi-axial, this is perhaps one of the driving factors in coming up with a mass ideology of which to speak in general, though hardly definitive terms with respect to our political system.
Yet another consideration, as many have probably noted, there is a real difference of opinion left-of-center (and I'll address this notion of relative positioning in the real substance of this diary; just go with the term for now) on what is the left-of-center ideological mainstream (within that grouping). It is a matter of language and inhering ideas. Simply put, there are liberals and there are progressives, both exhibiting differing notions of left-of-center ideology, though they are generally grouped together as a monolithic left-of-center center of gravity. This is different from having a multi-axial ideology; progressivism and liberalism are distinct visions though similar in their underlying ideological framework. There is not, as far as I know, an analogue on the right. Both left-of-center and right-of-center exhibit the multi-axial 'problems,' but only left-of-center exhibits this sort of ideological schizophrenia on the mass level.
Finally, without fully delving into definitional discussions of ideology, it should be noted that ideology can come in three flavors in the electorate and in individuals.
First is that of self-identification. Roughly 20-25% of the electorate identifies as liberal. Roughly 30% identify as conservative. The remainder identify as moderate. This set of figures goes back at least a few decades now (as an aside, it is interesting to compare this to elite opinion of the 1950s and early 1960s, where conservatism was largely dead in the public eye on the mass level; liberalism reigned supreme). However, this set of figures does not account for "progressive" as a potential category.
As noted above, there is considerable debate over labels in the left-of-center. I tend to believe that liberalism and progressivism are distinct and different for the most part. Other believe that they are veritably interchangeable and that "liberal" as a word has been so thoroughly tarnished by a popular and mass campaign by the right that "progressive" must now be it's stand-in (and there is a subset that believes that "liberal" must be rehabilitated as such). But early research has shown that with four ideological labels, "progressive" becomes a plurality, sucking up much of "liberal" and a good chunk of "moderate." So self-identification is a matter of study in ideology.
Second, ideology as a matter of self-identification has proven problematic. One issue is that the electorate, simply put, is not particularly sophisticated in applying such labels and they will tend towards popular "approved" terms. As noted, "liberal" has been tarnished and "conservative" vaunted. "Moderate" behaves more like the latter, elevated in stature by the likes of an elite cadre of believers and creators of conventional wisdom.
So, ideology cannot strictly be determined by self-identification in a real analysis of the electorate. I should note that my research on this topic, formally, focused most directly on self-identification on not on what follows here.
Ideology can be summarized by an aggregation of issue positions and an accompanying definition of what constitutes a tendency towards an ideology. Again, ideology is multi-axial, so this can prove problematic. For example, if someone responds affirmatively that healthcare should be a universal right and that the government has a role in guaranteeing it through affirmative program and action, that can be 'coded' as "liberal." If someone responds affirmatively that healthcare is a matter for markets to decide and that government should have no role in the matter, that can be 'coded' as "conservative." Obviously, this is problematic because a) definitions of ideology are then subject to the whims of the researcher b) ideology's multiple axes must be compressed into one single continuum (to be addressed here later). But one can credibly create an individual's - and an electorate's mass - ideological disposition based upon an aggregation of issue positions outside of a self-identification on a question asking one's ideology.
Third, ideology can be considered as a hybrid combination of issue positions and self-identification. This is probably the most robust notion conceptually, but statistically breaks down because of the non-sophistication of the electorate and the confusing of terms by decades of a concerted effort by the right to create a thought regime of asymmetry in ideology. There are scores of individual respondents in public opinion research that identify issue positions that we could reach consensus as being "liberal" but who self-identify, even strongly, as conservative.
So all three conceptions of ideology are important, but none of perfect. And none are inherently better statistically for analysis. My previous research focused on the first, because as a matter of research interest, I think that it is vital - especially in the context of an activist academic thinker and doer - that we understand ideology and its underlying factors in the polity in terms of one thing that really heavily influences political behavior on the long-term.
Now, all that said, let me address notions of relative ideological positions in the context of a pure-and-simple notion of ideology, without the baggage of research questions and problems as noted above.
We as a public are regularly subjected to talk of the nature of this nation's fundamental ideological disposition. Quite often, we are "treated" to two pathologies of a distaste for progressive/liberal/left-of-center/left in that discussion. One is that the conventional wisdom that there are equal components of extremists on two ends of an ideological spectrum. There is, according to this view, an extreme left and (maybe) an extreme right. Were one to achieve a consensus view of 'extreme' versions of left and right thought, I do not believe that one could find a preponderance of an extreme left in this country while one can easily find an extreme right. Further, there are virtually no voices of an extreme left in popular consciousness (e.g. politics, media) while there are certainly voices of the extreme right. But we are subject to a false equivalency of their presence and potency.
This is really a product, in my mind, of what I will discuss further on, but certainly related to the second pathology, itself a product of the real topic at hand in this diary. This second concept is that of a moderate center of public and political opinion. This is the conventional wisdom holding that the American people as an electorate are situated in between two ends of a continuum of ideology. It is the same notion that holds the keys to other items of conventional wisdom (e.g. the vitality of bi-partisanship as a virtue itself, "compromise" as virtuous action with regard to ideology or partisanship). I believe that this false "center-ism" (as I apply a term) or 'centrism' (as popularly conceived, and with which I disagree as an intellectual dishonesty or falsehood) is both toxic and demonstrably wrong. That is a matter for the future though I believe as it should probably follow from a more thorough grounding in the nature of partisanship and ideology and their interactions and underpinnings.
But to the point, mass ideology is generally thought of in conventional wisdom as a continuum or spectrum that runs left to right with a center. Further, this conventional wisdom seems predisposed to believe that this spectrum is anchored and absolute. As someone who wrote his senior thesis in philosophy on epistemology and in particular on absolute and relative truth, I take great issue with this.
First, the spectrum. Again, noting the dearth of real 'left' and "extreme left" thought and the wealth of that of the right and its extremes, this line of the ideological spectrum does not run fully to the left as it does to the right - at least in the minds and popular presence of ideological elites in public affairs. This says nothing of the electorate as such. And the electorate, in a democracy, should be of some importance. There is strong evidence that on particular issues, the American electorate itself is of more a 'left' predisposition on first principles if not values and policy prescriptions (although it tends to be on those too). But elites and the conventional wisdom hold a different set of assumptions and beliefs, and they are direct inputs in the actions of policy-makers and elected officials as proverbial "thought-" and "opinion-leaders."
This is a difficult proposition of the 'ideological process,' as I'll call it, because there is a reinforcing loop between popular and mass opinion and that of its elite leaders. But we try to interpret in mid-stream of the loop, frozen in conceptual time.
There is probably more that I could say about the spectrum, or alleged spectrum. But this is a blog, not a scholarly paper for singular publication at a moment in time - this is an evolving discussion that captures this point in conceptual time and is not necessarily meant to be definitive in the sense of being timeless and adding to a body of research. And certainly, I do not cover all the intellectual bases needed here to reach that level of discourse and vitality. I think I'll probably return to this, especially in the context of ideological opinion, later in this 'series' and at other times.
But what originally motivated me to write something on this topic and to endeavor to a 'series' of discussions of ideology and partisanship is the nature of relativism on the alleged ideological spectrum. Simply put, elite opinion vis a vis conventional wisdom is that there is a relative center between a left and a right, and one that encompasses the broad mass thought of the American electorate. This, I do not believe, is true.
Ideology is individual and mass both. Individuals hold individual opinions and aggregate into a mass. But on the mass scale, there is not inherently an aggregation proper of all opinion in some sort of grand equilibrium or average or median. Even thinking about it as such leaves one wanting for an explanation for the preponderance of center-ism.
Say for example that there is an electorate of 1000 people. Two hundred and fifty are generally liberal and conservative each, there are 100 each that are strongly conservative and liberal. Three hundred are moderate. But where does that leave the center, mathematically? It is hard to say and subject to interpretation. 350 each are essentially liberal or conservative while only 300 are moderate. Or, there are 00 that are in a general middle and 200 strongly ideological. But what are the degrees of the 250 on each end that are generally of one ideological disposition? What about the degrees of the strongly ideological? There are certainly other questions that could be asked about the nature of mass ideology. But we are regularly treated to discussion of ideology as inherently moderate or in the center.
Which brings me to the next point, is moderate in the center? What is moderate anyway? Is it a matter of degrees or a distinct ideological flavoring? Again, many questions can follow on this. Just like many questions can follow from a simplistic treatment of mass ideology.
Now, we must also address the axes of ideology as a matter of relativism. Conceptually, if the center is between two points, are we triangulating geometric points to find a center between all or of a general take on ideology (which I noted is anti-left in elite, conventional wisdom circles)? How are we defining this geometry? What if the spectrum is not linear (as I will address in the future)? How do we handle degrees? How do we handle absolute positions and then posit a relative position? These are the conceptual questions that are not only poorly-addressed, but they are rarely raised up in popular discourse on mass and individual ideology in the electorate. And for that, we have a poverty of political discussion, regardless of the real dynamics of political opinion as per identification and issue positions. Then again, what is the center between two issue positions?
I think that a good voice on public affairs can and should at times ask more questions than he or she answers. And while I certainly have my own opinions on some of these questions and a definitive framework to address them (which is constantly in search of a better articulation, a struggle itself), I think that simply raising up these questions is important as we work toward a political system that best addresses the common good and public interest as well as the democratic notions, in truth, of the electorate (which may not always align with the common good/public interest).
Suffice it to say that conventional wisdom on ideology is certainly impoverished by a lack of rigor in thought and analysis on the conceptual-theoretical level and the empirical level both. Center-ism is just a manifestation of this, and it is not one that holds of to critical thought and research particularly well. But for the time being, until it is thoroughly debunked, we will continue to live with it.
Friday, November 21, 2008
Why the "P" (or "p") In Democratic _arty Matters
The combination of the words "democratic" and "party" gets tossed around a lot as an essentially interchangeable concept, no matter how one treats the "p" in "party" as modifying "Democratic." But that's incorrect, and worse, it does a disservice to our discussion of progressive politics and American politics in general.
Political scientists who study parties and American politics in general usually look at 'parties' per se as three entities (and I'll just refer to the Democratic (P/p)arty here, not any others really). One is the Democratic Party proper, the party organization itself. For example, I am involved in my local and state Democratic Party organizations as an activist and as an officer. I pay my dues, I raise money, I volunteer for Democratic candidates and the party itself, I attend meeting...etc. The second version of parties is "party in government," as in the elected and appointed leaders in government (legislative and executive branches) who identify as and are elected as "Democratic" candidates. For example, my Congresswoman, the fabulous Tammy Baldwin, is a Democratic member of the U.S. House and caucuses with the other Democrats there. Finally, there is the "party in the electorate," which is a much more complex concept.
The Democratic party - and here, one does not capitalize the "p," as is usually the case with party-in-government too - is, like all parties-in-the-electorate, a combination of Democratic-identifying voters (including those who register as such, and in some cases these folks are part of the Democratic Party), Democratic-identified interest groups and organizations, and the voters that support a Democratic candidate in a given election. The Democratic party as a party-in-the-electorate is an aggregation and generally a coalition of individuals and organizations that is without a concerted program or teleology - it just is as a grouping.
So when people make reference to the "Democratic party," the intent of their words really matters, especially when we consider criticisms, normative statements, and the like. My general frame of reference, as a party leader in terms of the party-as-organization, is that folks are referring to the party organization. I subconsciously move directly to that when people say "Democratic party," and I have to check myself if that's not what they mean.
I'll speak to this more in the future, but I just want to lay out that the Democratic Party and the Democratic party are distinct conceptual constructs. One is very firm - you can go visit the office of your local party organization, you can give money to the party (and you should!), you can receive mail from the party organization, you can...well, you get the picture. But one cannot say with intellectual coherence, "The Democrats should ______" because unless you're speaking about the party organization (and I believe that one can do so in this kind of statement, as in "The Democrats should put together a concerted, strategic campaign to build membership."), you are not referring to a particular decision-maker or set of decision-makers who have the ability to implement what one is suggesting.
Democratic Party does not equal Democratic party, and that distinction is critical.
Political scientists who study parties and American politics in general usually look at 'parties' per se as three entities (and I'll just refer to the Democratic (P/p)arty here, not any others really). One is the Democratic Party proper, the party organization itself. For example, I am involved in my local and state Democratic Party organizations as an activist and as an officer. I pay my dues, I raise money, I volunteer for Democratic candidates and the party itself, I attend meeting...etc. The second version of parties is "party in government," as in the elected and appointed leaders in government (legislative and executive branches) who identify as and are elected as "Democratic" candidates. For example, my Congresswoman, the fabulous Tammy Baldwin, is a Democratic member of the U.S. House and caucuses with the other Democrats there. Finally, there is the "party in the electorate," which is a much more complex concept.
The Democratic party - and here, one does not capitalize the "p," as is usually the case with party-in-government too - is, like all parties-in-the-electorate, a combination of Democratic-identifying voters (including those who register as such, and in some cases these folks are part of the Democratic Party), Democratic-identified interest groups and organizations, and the voters that support a Democratic candidate in a given election. The Democratic party as a party-in-the-electorate is an aggregation and generally a coalition of individuals and organizations that is without a concerted program or teleology - it just is as a grouping.
So when people make reference to the "Democratic party," the intent of their words really matters, especially when we consider criticisms, normative statements, and the like. My general frame of reference, as a party leader in terms of the party-as-organization, is that folks are referring to the party organization. I subconsciously move directly to that when people say "Democratic party," and I have to check myself if that's not what they mean.
I'll speak to this more in the future, but I just want to lay out that the Democratic Party and the Democratic party are distinct conceptual constructs. One is very firm - you can go visit the office of your local party organization, you can give money to the party (and you should!), you can receive mail from the party organization, you can...well, you get the picture. But one cannot say with intellectual coherence, "The Democrats should ______" because unless you're speaking about the party organization (and I believe that one can do so in this kind of statement, as in "The Democrats should put together a concerted, strategic campaign to build membership."), you are not referring to a particular decision-maker or set of decision-makers who have the ability to implement what one is suggesting.
Democratic Party does not equal Democratic party, and that distinction is critical.
Wage Frustration
Title of the diary is not about me. Although I would guess that pretty much anyone that reads a blog probably wishes their wages were higher, and is thus frustrated.
A few bits of the ridiculous from this week's latest thrashing over our fundamentally mis-structured economy, relating to wages...
We have corporate executives who make literally thousands, tens of thousands of dollars per hour who run massive companies into the ground because of supremely short-sighted vision, lack of business sense, and the strategic direction of lemmings. They get mildly berated because they didn't fly commercial. And they'll still retire rich after being part of the class and type of thinking that messed up this country's economy and destroyed our productive capacities. But no one is considering the utter absurdity of the existence of this type of 'work' and set of wages.
On the other hand, there are union workers that have been faithfully executing the demands of the corporations who employ them for decades. Along the way, they bargained collectively for what used to be the uniquely American private social safety net and set wage levels for many industries. They gave up concessions left and right as the corporations for which they work sputtered along because of poor management (it has not been labor costs that sunk the auto industry, it's been strategic blindness). Yet we have people lambasting those "greedy" union workers for aspiring to turn work into real gains in the pocketbook.
Does something seem totally off to you about this?
It does to me.
For decades, the American public has been fed a steady diet of anti-union propaganda through the filer of an overarching philosophy of neoliberalism and conservatism. So people are primed to think unions and union workers are part of the problem. Actually, they're part of the solution. Unions capture gains in national wealth for those who create it. And if more people supported labor and labor struggles, all workers would benefit. So instead of blaming unions for the mess autos and other industries are in, we should place blame where it lays, and we should look to what can be done to build a stronger and more robust economy from the ground up. This includes a re-structuring of relationships between markets, government, and people and it includes fostering greater numbers of unionized workers and higher union density rates within industries as well as the workforce at large.
There is a great labor economics argument for how this will help the economy as a whole, but I have neither the time nor capacity to run through it all right now. Perhaps in the future. Suffice it to say for now that we should be outraged nationally on how blame and aspersions are being placed on unions and union workers - while we essentially let off the hook the economic model and real perpetrators of the economic crimes being committed. As a logical corollary, we should not be trying to put together "solutions" to the crisis in the auto industry (and it is industry-wide, not just about Detroit) that place the burdens on the backs of workers. It's foolish and it's wrong.
A few bits of the ridiculous from this week's latest thrashing over our fundamentally mis-structured economy, relating to wages...
We have corporate executives who make literally thousands, tens of thousands of dollars per hour who run massive companies into the ground because of supremely short-sighted vision, lack of business sense, and the strategic direction of lemmings. They get mildly berated because they didn't fly commercial. And they'll still retire rich after being part of the class and type of thinking that messed up this country's economy and destroyed our productive capacities. But no one is considering the utter absurdity of the existence of this type of 'work' and set of wages.
On the other hand, there are union workers that have been faithfully executing the demands of the corporations who employ them for decades. Along the way, they bargained collectively for what used to be the uniquely American private social safety net and set wage levels for many industries. They gave up concessions left and right as the corporations for which they work sputtered along because of poor management (it has not been labor costs that sunk the auto industry, it's been strategic blindness). Yet we have people lambasting those "greedy" union workers for aspiring to turn work into real gains in the pocketbook.
Does something seem totally off to you about this?
It does to me.
For decades, the American public has been fed a steady diet of anti-union propaganda through the filer of an overarching philosophy of neoliberalism and conservatism. So people are primed to think unions and union workers are part of the problem. Actually, they're part of the solution. Unions capture gains in national wealth for those who create it. And if more people supported labor and labor struggles, all workers would benefit. So instead of blaming unions for the mess autos and other industries are in, we should place blame where it lays, and we should look to what can be done to build a stronger and more robust economy from the ground up. This includes a re-structuring of relationships between markets, government, and people and it includes fostering greater numbers of unionized workers and higher union density rates within industries as well as the workforce at large.
There is a great labor economics argument for how this will help the economy as a whole, but I have neither the time nor capacity to run through it all right now. Perhaps in the future. Suffice it to say for now that we should be outraged nationally on how blame and aspersions are being placed on unions and union workers - while we essentially let off the hook the economic model and real perpetrators of the economic crimes being committed. As a logical corollary, we should not be trying to put together "solutions" to the crisis in the auto industry (and it is industry-wide, not just about Detroit) that place the burdens on the backs of workers. It's foolish and it's wrong.
Thursday, November 20, 2008
Thank Goodness for TAP
There are a few periodicals I read regularly, without fail. A couple are more nuanced to those of us who are very interested in and study the labor movement and especially its future. The others are largely more "mainstream" political journals of reporting and opinion. The best though has to be the American Prospect. TAP regularly churns out moderate-liberal (dare I say center-left) pieces of interest and thought. Their speciality seems to be political economy, and looking at their editorial group, it's no wonder. Over the years, the co-founders and regular types are like a who's who of noted moderate-liberal political economists.
This week, they've been fully up to the task of creating interesting, topical pieces that are worth a read. They include some web-only articles and those that will be in the next print edition (it's always a struggle for me to decide to read them online or wait until my copy arrives in the mail).
The most journalistic of this month has to be "Paper Chase," a study in the mounds of paper in think-tank reports, briefings, and memos that are being churned out as the Obama transition has gotten under way. I for one love the stacks of paper (although mine are on my hard-drive in .pdf form for the most part). For people like me (and I realize that's probably a small chunk of populace in this regard - literal students of public affairs and real policy nerds), the voluminous output of the liberal and liberal-ish think tanks keeps us up at night, cranking through reading piece after piece.
These think-tanks have been at this for probably 9 months now, drafting, writing, revising, editing, and then revising again to keep pace with the rapidly evolving crises and opportunities confronting our nation. Some of the material has gotten into books, others in briefing packets. Most all of it worth a read. And that's the crux of the article: will the administration, or even Obama himself, read the stuff. My guess? Yes. That's why you pay a staff and assign portfolios. There are lots of really smart people out there who are topical experts that can not only put together good plans, but also contextualize them in a way that articulates ideas and plans a) in language that is digestable not only for the policy staffer on the go but also the average person and b) in messaging style that can be used in political communications.
I definitely recommend checking out some of the materials referenced in the article, in addition to the article itself.
The second set of articles in TAP are more like a pair than any others. Paul Waldman's "Can Obama Make Wonks and Hacks Work Together" is the partner of Mark Schmitt's "Audacity of Patience" because they discuss the interplay of running a political office, balancing the need for good policy with good politics and getting them to work together synergistically to feed one another.
Waldman quickly: Bill Clinton's ambitious agenda in 1993 was derailed by bad politics (and no, Clinton didn't struggle because he tried to govern "from the left" early on) and policy complexities that fed the former; and George Bush's operation was entirely run by politicos who didn't give a damn about whether policy was good or not, only that it drove the conservative agenda (and it caught up with him). Obama needs to get the wonks and hacks to play nicely and feed one another, crafting not only an agenda, but also an order to the agenda that gets implemented with discipline and rigor.
Thank goodness that Obama seems to be bringing on people who can work with Congress and that his agenda at least has the appearance of tackling the major challenges in front of us. As something of an aside, two very important people this week were Tom Daschle and Henry Waxman. Say what you want about the Lieberman kerfuffle (I call it a fiasco of sorts) in the Senate. That wasn't about keeping Lieberman in the caucus (game theory should have taught Harry Reid that he wouldn't leave to become a zero-seniority backbencher with a platform in the minority caucus set to lose his seat in a few years - Reid buckled because the Senate is clubby and fundamentally un-progressive for now). This was about votes against a GOP filibuster. Caucuses don't win filibuster battles, votes do. Lieberman was staying right where he is on what will be the contentious fights on domestic policy in the Senate. He'll be there for Obama's agenda (I hope). And he would have been had he been booted from his chairmanship.
But anyway, Tom Daschle's appointment as Secretary of HHS means that Obama will be driving towards real healthcare reform. You don't pick a former Senator to be a bureaucrat running an agency. You pick a guy like Daschle to craft and implement legislation. And judging by Daschle's past statements, speeches, and writing, we're in for some strong action early on in the Obama admin as per healthcare. Will we get universal healthcare - or even universal coverage - right away? Probably not. But we'll get major healthcare victories that are - you guessed it - good politics and good policy.
The Waxman-Dingell fight in the House is a harbinger of a more progressive House and legislation to come out of it. As chair of Energy & Commerce, Waxman will shepherd through climate change legislation that Dingell never would have allowed. And Obama's de facto (if not de jure) leg director is a former Waxman staffer. Pelosi was silent on this battle - though her top aide in the house, George Miller, whipped for Dingell. You can tell where Nancy Pelosi was on this, and that tells you that there's some sort of concerted effort to get in place the mechanisms for moving a Democratic Obama agenda through Congress at least.
Back to TAP... Schmitt is much harder to summarize. His points are many and expansive. My best attempt at shortening his work, though it too is worth a read or else I wouldn't have linked to it above, is that Obama needs to move on a bold agenda, but he doesn't need to ram it through immediately. He can build on successes, matching with his personal style and demeanor, and escape the pitfalls that Clinton and Bush fell prey to in their early (and latter) days.
For all the crappy analogies being made about Obama the politician and Obama the former community organizer, he's got two things going for him, as Schmitt points out. One is that Obama gets that establishing relationships and mobilizing around them matters. Two is that patience is a virtue in seeking longer-term, bigger-gain ends than a quick push with high stakes can deliver. Time will tell. Bottom-line: a "100 Days" type administration probably isn't coming our way, at least on Big Picture, historical-level policy and legislative action. But that's a good thing. It's like Heinz ketchup on steroids: good things come to those who wait, and tastier, yummier ketchup awaits those with enough patience not to get thrown off-course. To mix metaphors and abuse them.
Finally, TAP's roundtable on keeping the "youth" vote/activists for Obama engaged is really strong, if too short. "How Do We Keep Obama's Youth Mobilized" brings to the writing table nine people with some perspective on how to turn the under-30 Obama Democrats into a political force - and not just for the good government aspects of higher civic participation.
There are a variety of perspectives and approaches. I can speak to this with my own, as someone under thirty years of age and as someone who went to the mat for Obama. Bear in mind that I never got the Obama vapors or drank the Kool-Aid, but saw him for what he was/is: a good politician that offered the best opportunity for progressive change. And I came to this conclusion after supporting John Edwards throughout the primary until he dropped out and then remaining agnostic between Clinton and Obama until the nomination was all but decided.
The best way for 'us' to turn the massive generational mobilization and support for Obama into further real successes is...many ways. We can't just have a one-size-fits-all approach, like in any organizing for social change. There will need to be insiders and outsiders, folks who get involved in the progressive movement proper and some who become an external force. Of course, some will drop out. That's not a generational comment, it's an observation of reality.
I think we need to develop leadership amongst this cohort and I think we need to plug them into existing institutions while providing support where others want to create their own. My only advice to fellow 'young' activists is to be strategic. Don't be blind followers of Obama and don't let this opportunity subside. For years, we have been ignored because it was said we wouldn't vote. Well, we did. And we have now for a few elections. It's time people like Obama and other national-level politicians respond to our concerns - which are not limited to things like student loans.
More on this another time. Time to get back to reading those think-tank reports before bed.
This week, they've been fully up to the task of creating interesting, topical pieces that are worth a read. They include some web-only articles and those that will be in the next print edition (it's always a struggle for me to decide to read them online or wait until my copy arrives in the mail).
The most journalistic of this month has to be "Paper Chase," a study in the mounds of paper in think-tank reports, briefings, and memos that are being churned out as the Obama transition has gotten under way. I for one love the stacks of paper (although mine are on my hard-drive in .pdf form for the most part). For people like me (and I realize that's probably a small chunk of populace in this regard - literal students of public affairs and real policy nerds), the voluminous output of the liberal and liberal-ish think tanks keeps us up at night, cranking through reading piece after piece.
These think-tanks have been at this for probably 9 months now, drafting, writing, revising, editing, and then revising again to keep pace with the rapidly evolving crises and opportunities confronting our nation. Some of the material has gotten into books, others in briefing packets. Most all of it worth a read. And that's the crux of the article: will the administration, or even Obama himself, read the stuff. My guess? Yes. That's why you pay a staff and assign portfolios. There are lots of really smart people out there who are topical experts that can not only put together good plans, but also contextualize them in a way that articulates ideas and plans a) in language that is digestable not only for the policy staffer on the go but also the average person and b) in messaging style that can be used in political communications.
I definitely recommend checking out some of the materials referenced in the article, in addition to the article itself.
The second set of articles in TAP are more like a pair than any others. Paul Waldman's "Can Obama Make Wonks and Hacks Work Together" is the partner of Mark Schmitt's "Audacity of Patience" because they discuss the interplay of running a political office, balancing the need for good policy with good politics and getting them to work together synergistically to feed one another.
Waldman quickly: Bill Clinton's ambitious agenda in 1993 was derailed by bad politics (and no, Clinton didn't struggle because he tried to govern "from the left" early on) and policy complexities that fed the former; and George Bush's operation was entirely run by politicos who didn't give a damn about whether policy was good or not, only that it drove the conservative agenda (and it caught up with him). Obama needs to get the wonks and hacks to play nicely and feed one another, crafting not only an agenda, but also an order to the agenda that gets implemented with discipline and rigor.
Thank goodness that Obama seems to be bringing on people who can work with Congress and that his agenda at least has the appearance of tackling the major challenges in front of us. As something of an aside, two very important people this week were Tom Daschle and Henry Waxman. Say what you want about the Lieberman kerfuffle (I call it a fiasco of sorts) in the Senate. That wasn't about keeping Lieberman in the caucus (game theory should have taught Harry Reid that he wouldn't leave to become a zero-seniority backbencher with a platform in the minority caucus set to lose his seat in a few years - Reid buckled because the Senate is clubby and fundamentally un-progressive for now). This was about votes against a GOP filibuster. Caucuses don't win filibuster battles, votes do. Lieberman was staying right where he is on what will be the contentious fights on domestic policy in the Senate. He'll be there for Obama's agenda (I hope). And he would have been had he been booted from his chairmanship.
But anyway, Tom Daschle's appointment as Secretary of HHS means that Obama will be driving towards real healthcare reform. You don't pick a former Senator to be a bureaucrat running an agency. You pick a guy like Daschle to craft and implement legislation. And judging by Daschle's past statements, speeches, and writing, we're in for some strong action early on in the Obama admin as per healthcare. Will we get universal healthcare - or even universal coverage - right away? Probably not. But we'll get major healthcare victories that are - you guessed it - good politics and good policy.
The Waxman-Dingell fight in the House is a harbinger of a more progressive House and legislation to come out of it. As chair of Energy & Commerce, Waxman will shepherd through climate change legislation that Dingell never would have allowed. And Obama's de facto (if not de jure) leg director is a former Waxman staffer. Pelosi was silent on this battle - though her top aide in the house, George Miller, whipped for Dingell. You can tell where Nancy Pelosi was on this, and that tells you that there's some sort of concerted effort to get in place the mechanisms for moving a Democratic Obama agenda through Congress at least.
Back to TAP... Schmitt is much harder to summarize. His points are many and expansive. My best attempt at shortening his work, though it too is worth a read or else I wouldn't have linked to it above, is that Obama needs to move on a bold agenda, but he doesn't need to ram it through immediately. He can build on successes, matching with his personal style and demeanor, and escape the pitfalls that Clinton and Bush fell prey to in their early (and latter) days.
For all the crappy analogies being made about Obama the politician and Obama the former community organizer, he's got two things going for him, as Schmitt points out. One is that Obama gets that establishing relationships and mobilizing around them matters. Two is that patience is a virtue in seeking longer-term, bigger-gain ends than a quick push with high stakes can deliver. Time will tell. Bottom-line: a "100 Days" type administration probably isn't coming our way, at least on Big Picture, historical-level policy and legislative action. But that's a good thing. It's like Heinz ketchup on steroids: good things come to those who wait, and tastier, yummier ketchup awaits those with enough patience not to get thrown off-course. To mix metaphors and abuse them.
Finally, TAP's roundtable on keeping the "youth" vote/activists for Obama engaged is really strong, if too short. "How Do We Keep Obama's Youth Mobilized" brings to the writing table nine people with some perspective on how to turn the under-30 Obama Democrats into a political force - and not just for the good government aspects of higher civic participation.
There are a variety of perspectives and approaches. I can speak to this with my own, as someone under thirty years of age and as someone who went to the mat for Obama. Bear in mind that I never got the Obama vapors or drank the Kool-Aid, but saw him for what he was/is: a good politician that offered the best opportunity for progressive change. And I came to this conclusion after supporting John Edwards throughout the primary until he dropped out and then remaining agnostic between Clinton and Obama until the nomination was all but decided.
The best way for 'us' to turn the massive generational mobilization and support for Obama into further real successes is...many ways. We can't just have a one-size-fits-all approach, like in any organizing for social change. There will need to be insiders and outsiders, folks who get involved in the progressive movement proper and some who become an external force. Of course, some will drop out. That's not a generational comment, it's an observation of reality.
I think we need to develop leadership amongst this cohort and I think we need to plug them into existing institutions while providing support where others want to create their own. My only advice to fellow 'young' activists is to be strategic. Don't be blind followers of Obama and don't let this opportunity subside. For years, we have been ignored because it was said we wouldn't vote. Well, we did. And we have now for a few elections. It's time people like Obama and other national-level politicians respond to our concerns - which are not limited to things like student loans.
More on this another time. Time to get back to reading those think-tank reports before bed.
Wednesday, November 19, 2008
Party Systems
As a prelude to some things I'd like to write about in the future, I want to introduce the idea in political science of party systems. Party systems are eras of dominance by a given dynamic between (and within) the two parties in government, in the electorate, and as organizations (but mostly the first two). There have been four definitive party systems in American history, starting very near the dawn of the republic, and depending on with whom one speaks, concluding in or around the mid- to late-1960s.
The First Party System was from roughly 1792 to 1824. the Second Party System was from roughly 1826 to 1894; the Third Party System from 1896 to 1930; the Fourth Party System from roughly 1932 to 1968 (I say it ends at 1968, which is also the dawn of my hypothesized Fifth Party System which is actually two periods of de-alignment).
Why is this important?
In looking at the last thirty years, the party systems have had tremendous impacts on our democracy and policies it has brought about. And as importantly, what has happened recently could very well be the beginning of a new, Sixth Party System. The consequences could be a) en era of dominance for Democrats and potentially an era of progressive governance and b) a radical transformation of the Republican party or its shrinking from the American political scene. The smart money with respect to the GOP is on the former.
Finally, to end this introductory note, consider Karl Rove circa 2004, declaring the emergence of an enduring Republican majority. He misread politics and governing and today he looks like a fool. So that means take anything anyone says about projecting party systems and realignment with the requisite grain of salt. Or perhaps a whole shaker full of them.
The First Party System was from roughly 1792 to 1824. the Second Party System was from roughly 1826 to 1894; the Third Party System from 1896 to 1930; the Fourth Party System from roughly 1932 to 1968 (I say it ends at 1968, which is also the dawn of my hypothesized Fifth Party System which is actually two periods of de-alignment).
Why is this important?
In looking at the last thirty years, the party systems have had tremendous impacts on our democracy and policies it has brought about. And as importantly, what has happened recently could very well be the beginning of a new, Sixth Party System. The consequences could be a) en era of dominance for Democrats and potentially an era of progressive governance and b) a radical transformation of the Republican party or its shrinking from the American political scene. The smart money with respect to the GOP is on the former.
Finally, to end this introductory note, consider Karl Rove circa 2004, declaring the emergence of an enduring Republican majority. He misread politics and governing and today he looks like a fool. So that means take anything anyone says about projecting party systems and realignment with the requisite grain of salt. Or perhaps a whole shaker full of them.
What's In a Word: Change
Since about a year ago, every pundit worth their salt had their own way of saying that the 2008 presidential election would be a "change" election. If I hear one more of them blather on about how this was a central theme to Barack Obama's campaign, I might just vomit. For what it's worth, Barack Obama was joined in this articulation by both John Edwards (who I supported) and Hillary Clinton. But Obama really made it a hallmark of his campaign.
The thing is that he never made it specific. Which is fine by me, at least in some ways.
But everyone knew what he meant, at least viscerally. We had eight years of George Bush and thirty years of conservative hegemony. Policies they enacted (and much of the Clinton domestic policy agenda was thoroughly framed in a conservative lens in his soft version of neoliberalism) were bad, and they finally caught up with us. I'm talking on a meta-level, American domestic policy was bad, from fiscal to monetary to programmatic. And in a big way, it's all caught up with us. I certainly don't need to break the news to anyone on the general picture or the specifics.
What bothers me right now is that these very same pundits (whose only qualification seems to be having a platform - no matter how many times they're wrong or how much they don't get it, they self-perpetuate their platform and the danger in which they put the republic) who spoke about Obama and change are now questioning much of it.
How many right-wingers have there been on cable news shows? I lost track and almost lost it all today when I saw Mike Huckabee on CNN. Why is the crack-up of conservatism and the GOP a real story when in 2000 and 2004, as well as the intervening years, there was virtually no cable talk about the internal thrashing of Democrats and the rise of a nascent progressive movement? My snide aside is that we have been going through this in different cycles since at least the 80s. But that's not the issue here.
How many times have we had to endure some conservative pundit telling us that America is still a center-right nation? How many concern trolls in mass media are warning that Obama and the Congressional Democrats should not "overreach"? Didn't this election at least validate in some ways the partisan preferences for Democrats on the part of the American people? [Note: I could offer up some statistical proof of this now based upon exit polls and results, but I'm holding out until December when the Census Bureau I believe releases good election surveys and when the American National Election Study puts out some numbers too - that's also when my semester ends.]
And what stimulated me to write something today is the narrative of questioning from these pundits about Barack Obama's transition and governmental teams. They are asking, with the preponderance of legacy Clinton staffers, how Obama can be said to be living up to his mantle of being a change candidate and president-elect.
Well, the issue of change for people was less about the inside baseball of who is where and what their previous employment has been, and more so about a change in policies and ideological orientation.
Barack Obama, who I have and will continue to criticize even though I am a partisan Democrat and ideological progressive, is going to bring change in his policies and what his administration accomplishes. THAT is the change we voted for - and to steal a phrase and abuse it - what we believe in.
The thing is that he never made it specific. Which is fine by me, at least in some ways.
But everyone knew what he meant, at least viscerally. We had eight years of George Bush and thirty years of conservative hegemony. Policies they enacted (and much of the Clinton domestic policy agenda was thoroughly framed in a conservative lens in his soft version of neoliberalism) were bad, and they finally caught up with us. I'm talking on a meta-level, American domestic policy was bad, from fiscal to monetary to programmatic. And in a big way, it's all caught up with us. I certainly don't need to break the news to anyone on the general picture or the specifics.
What bothers me right now is that these very same pundits (whose only qualification seems to be having a platform - no matter how many times they're wrong or how much they don't get it, they self-perpetuate their platform and the danger in which they put the republic) who spoke about Obama and change are now questioning much of it.
How many right-wingers have there been on cable news shows? I lost track and almost lost it all today when I saw Mike Huckabee on CNN. Why is the crack-up of conservatism and the GOP a real story when in 2000 and 2004, as well as the intervening years, there was virtually no cable talk about the internal thrashing of Democrats and the rise of a nascent progressive movement? My snide aside is that we have been going through this in different cycles since at least the 80s. But that's not the issue here.
How many times have we had to endure some conservative pundit telling us that America is still a center-right nation? How many concern trolls in mass media are warning that Obama and the Congressional Democrats should not "overreach"? Didn't this election at least validate in some ways the partisan preferences for Democrats on the part of the American people? [Note: I could offer up some statistical proof of this now based upon exit polls and results, but I'm holding out until December when the Census Bureau I believe releases good election surveys and when the American National Election Study puts out some numbers too - that's also when my semester ends.]
And what stimulated me to write something today is the narrative of questioning from these pundits about Barack Obama's transition and governmental teams. They are asking, with the preponderance of legacy Clinton staffers, how Obama can be said to be living up to his mantle of being a change candidate and president-elect.
Well, the issue of change for people was less about the inside baseball of who is where and what their previous employment has been, and more so about a change in policies and ideological orientation.
Barack Obama, who I have and will continue to criticize even though I am a partisan Democrat and ideological progressive, is going to bring change in his policies and what his administration accomplishes. THAT is the change we voted for - and to steal a phrase and abuse it - what we believe in.
Tuesday, November 11, 2008
Making It Easier To Organize or Leveling the Playing Field
Watch and be frustrated:
American labor law is broken. It has been for years. And the evidence isn't just the declining number of union members and union density rate in the private sector (and overall). Although that is troubling in its own regard.
American labor law is a) a relic of the middle part of the 20th century b) subject to years of 'tweaking' by the right and corporate power and c) totally unsuited for the nature of work, our economy, and our social relationships in the 21st century.
Right now, the scales are tilted against unions. An objective observer (which I am probably not) would probably say that the playing field is totally uneven. From the disparity in penalties for unions and business to the structure of the legal regime to countless other facets, the scales tilt toward business and the playing field is badly slanted.
The Employee Free Choice Act is not about tilting the scales in favor of unions, as Dr. Dean adroitly points out. It is about modernizing American labor law and making the playing field even once again. As it turns out, when one gets beyond this simple and perfecly good rationale (not to mention the guarantee of substantive First Amendment rights for workers), one finds that there are tremendous policy, political, social, and economic benefits.
EFCA is a necessary condition for a resurgence in unions and the labor movement, though not sufficient. But right now, we need to be certain that we have a fair game for organizing campaigns.
Card-check means that labor law matches the realities of the 21st century economy, labor markets, and social structures. So get over it Chris Matthews, right wing blowhards, and anti-labor corporate tools.
And by the way, 2008 marked the highest favorability margin for unions in America since the 1960s. 68% of the public is in favor of unions having a strong role in this country while 20% are against it. That's a gap of 40%. Further, recent research has shown that 58% of workers would choose a union if so freely able.
Right now, workers are not freely able to choose unions - EFCA would go a long way in remedying that (though not all the way). And EFCA would align policy with overwhelming public opinion.
Time to modernize American labor law, time to make labor law work. Time to pass the Employee Free Choice Act. President-elect Obama, Democratic Senate, we're looking at you.
American labor law is broken. It has been for years. And the evidence isn't just the declining number of union members and union density rate in the private sector (and overall). Although that is troubling in its own regard.
American labor law is a) a relic of the middle part of the 20th century b) subject to years of 'tweaking' by the right and corporate power and c) totally unsuited for the nature of work, our economy, and our social relationships in the 21st century.
Right now, the scales are tilted against unions. An objective observer (which I am probably not) would probably say that the playing field is totally uneven. From the disparity in penalties for unions and business to the structure of the legal regime to countless other facets, the scales tilt toward business and the playing field is badly slanted.
The Employee Free Choice Act is not about tilting the scales in favor of unions, as Dr. Dean adroitly points out. It is about modernizing American labor law and making the playing field even once again. As it turns out, when one gets beyond this simple and perfecly good rationale (not to mention the guarantee of substantive First Amendment rights for workers), one finds that there are tremendous policy, political, social, and economic benefits.
EFCA is a necessary condition for a resurgence in unions and the labor movement, though not sufficient. But right now, we need to be certain that we have a fair game for organizing campaigns.
Card-check means that labor law matches the realities of the 21st century economy, labor markets, and social structures. So get over it Chris Matthews, right wing blowhards, and anti-labor corporate tools.
And by the way, 2008 marked the highest favorability margin for unions in America since the 1960s. 68% of the public is in favor of unions having a strong role in this country while 20% are against it. That's a gap of 40%. Further, recent research has shown that 58% of workers would choose a union if so freely able.
Right now, workers are not freely able to choose unions - EFCA would go a long way in remedying that (though not all the way). And EFCA would align policy with overwhelming public opinion.
Time to modernize American labor law, time to make labor law work. Time to pass the Employee Free Choice Act. President-elect Obama, Democratic Senate, we're looking at you.
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